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company	due	to	the	fact	that	a	stock	experienced	a	stock	price	crash	risk,	that	may	be	attributed	to	the	way	in	which	a	company’s	management	discloses	information	to	the	market.	In	this	study,	the	results	are	relevant	to	standard	setters	who	stress	it	as	their	role	and	responsibility	to	help	nurture	and	restore	investor	confidence	(U.S.	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	2008).	The	restoration	of	investor	confidence	is	crucial	if	the	economic	longevity	of	the	United	States	of	America	is	to	be	assured.	It	is	essential	to	bring	retail	investors	back	into	the	financial	system,	if	they	are	too	distrustful	of	the	market	to	even	participate	it	in	it	then	the	economic	wheels	that	deployed	capital	in	the	U.S.	will	cease	to	turn.			 This	study	will	add	to	the	literature	that	attempts	to	link	ex-ante	crash	risk	to	financial	reporting.	Most	recently	in	the	last	couple	of	years	there	have	been	significant	breakthroughs	that	have	lead	us	to	analyze	and	look	for	previously	un	noticed	contributors	to	a	stock	price	crash.	Kim	and	Zhang	(2014)	document	that	ex	ante	crash	risk	increases	with	the	presence	of	financial	restatements	and	internal	control	weaknesses.	And	even	more	recently	J.-B.	Kim	et	all	(2016)	that	find	high	comparability	is	associated	with	low	ex	ante	crash	risk	,	even	after	controlling	for	various	aspects	of	reporting	quality	or	transparency.	In	this	respect	the	study	adds	to	the	understanding	of	the	linkage	between	ex-ante	crash	risk	and	managements	guidance	activity.		This	report	shows	that	there	is	a	negative	effect	upon	management	guidance,	and	perceived	stock	price	crash	risk	using	the	implied	volatility	skew1.	The	exploration	of	a	linkage	between	the	implied	volatility	skew																																																										 The option smirk curve is an indicator of investors' expected crash risk (Dumas et al., 1998; Bates, 2000). 
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and	management	guidance	has	yet	to	be	analyzed,	and	this	study	will	hopefully	encourage	more	analysis	upon	various	risk	proxies	in	the	derivatives	market	and	their	effect	upon	a	company’s	management.			 This	study	will	also	add	to	the	literature	that	focuses	on	manager’s	asymmetric	disclosure	of	good	versus	bad	news.	The	prior	studies	done	by	Jin	and	Myers	(2006)	conclude	that	managers	tend	to	systematically	withhold	bad	news.	Once	again,	one	of	the	more	recent	studies	done	by	J.-b.	kim	et	al	(2016)	suggests	that	financial	statement	comparability,	can	also	disincline	mangers	from	withholding	bad	news.	This	study	will	contribute	to	this	field	of	finance	by	confirming	the	fact	that	management	tends	to	withhold	bad	news,	and	further	showing	that	even	in	cases	when	management	can’t	for	see	a	macro-economic	shock	that	will	be	materially	impactful	upon	their	earnings,	management	will	tend	to	withhold	giving	guidance.	However,	depending	upon	an	industries	concentration,	using	the	HHI	index	2,	this	study	finds	that	for	the	observed	crisis	period	overall	earnings	volatility	isn’t	statically	significant	to	management	guidance	when	considering	all	the	companies	in	our	sample	set3,		even	in	the	presence	of	macro-economic	event	such	as	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.			 The	remainder	of	this	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	2.	Reviews	the	related	literature	and	further	explains	the	hypothesis.		Section	3.	Describes	the																																																																																																																																																																								2.	product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI). 	3.		Thomson Reuters’ First Call Historical Database (FCHD) was the initial data set that was used 











(Kale et al., 1991; Chan et al., 2001) concluded that there was positive relationship 
between high outcome uncertainty and abnormal earnings, cash flow, and stock price 
return volatility that inevitably increases the opportunity for the variables leading to cause 
a stock price crash. A variable,  that with some development could potentially serve as a 
proxy for the variable that I described, is the STRATEGY variable developed by Bentley 






















																																																								5	The value of the option delta is between 0.375 and 0.625 (denoted ATMC) or between 0.375 and 0.125 






















																																																								6	Consistent with prior studies (Bollen and Whaley, 2004; Kim and Zhang, 2014), OTM puts are defined as 
put options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.125 and ATM calls are defined as call options with a 






























































































=𝜎!𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜎!𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟)		 		
Section	4.	Main	Empirical	Results		
For this paper I divided the time period into four periods following: three periods: Gen. 
Crisis: (August 2006-December 9th, 2009), Pre-crisis (August 2006–July 2007); Crisis I 
(August 2007–July 2008); and Crisis II (August 2008– December 2008). The Pre-crisis 
period is the year leading up to the collapse of the credit boom. Crisis I starts with the 
collapse of the subprime market in the summer of 2007. Crisis II begins in August 2008 
when CDS spreads of financial institutions start rising and it covers the period of greatest 
concerns about the liquidity and solvency of the financial system (the banking panic). 
Crisis III begins in September 2008- December 9th, 2009. (Scharfstein, 2010). The final 
step in the data analysis process was to winserize the variables, and insert a lag to allow 
for the proper interaction between all the variables.  
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in	this	case.		Table A.2 includes the results from a GLS regression run only on data 
included from a bank, (This was done by sorting the data by SIC).  This analysis was run 
in order to account for random effects and exclude any bias. Based on the results we 
determine that ln_mark~p, twelve_~t and sale_vol are all significant through each 
quarter tested. This indicates that they are all parameters that banks take into 
consideration when issuing management guidance. That said, the predictor leverage is 
insignificant for the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. This would imply that leverage is not 
a major indicator for banks when issuing management guidance. Additionally, earn_vol 
(the predictor for earnings volatility) is significant in the pre-crisis period but is 
insignificant in the last quarter. This indicates that banks were concerned with earnings 
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volatility before and during the crash. However, in the subsequent quarters after the 
crash, they became less concerned with including earnings volatility as a parameter for 
management guidance in a time of crisis. This is a relevant finding because it provides 
empirical evidence that banks are less concerned with earnings volatility after a crisis, 
and only during a time where inadequate management skill could be used to potentially 
blame them for failing to see the effect/potential effect of a macro-economic shock.  
 After seeing the statistical pattern relationship shown in Table B.1 there is a clear 
need to look at the relationship for management guidance, and other firm level variables 
with regards to a low concentrated industry. Therefore, for this last regression I dropped 
all companies that didn’t have “25” starting their SIC #. This drops all the companies 
except those involved in the manufacturing sector, specifically those that focus on 
making home furniture items etc.  Table C.1 show the output results of another GLS 
regression excluding the data from banks (i.e. only including manufacturing-industry 
data). For the general crisis period, twelve-month earnings, market cap and sales 
volatility are all significant indicators in management guidance. Additionally, earnings 
volatility is significant by a narrow margin (0.0405). However, the most interesting part of 
this regression is how earnings volatility for manufacturing companies, act oppositely 
with regards to statistical significance than financial companies who are in a more 
concentrated industry, which has been shown by earlier studies to have a negative 
statically relationship with guidance. Earnings volatility not being significant during the 
CP2 for manufacturing companies shows that the market, and management were 
concerned with it only after the CP1 had begun, because the macro-economic shock 
was directly involved in this sector such as with the financial institutions. Also in this 
output, we observe that leverage is insignificant for every quarter tested. The crash 
variable is significant after the CP2showing that, a company experiencing a stock price 
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crash, and being a manufacturing company during this time was likely to issue guidance 
after the market realized the initial shock had be realized. Crash quarter is significant 
every period except during the start of the crisis at CP1 showing that during this time 
period, the management recognized that their company could be hit materially from the 
impact in the other sectors of the economy. The lagged IV_Skew variable is once again 
significant through the overall regression period and within the sub units of time, showing 
that manufacturing management does care about the perceived stock price crash risk by 
the market. Once again a negative statistical relationship is observed between stock 
price crash risk and management guidance. Leverage once again is insignificant to the 
management guidance. The several variables, sales volatility, twelve month return and 
market cap once again have statistical significance with management guidance, and in 
this case both variables are positively correlated with management guidance.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 In conclusion this study shows that there is a statically significant relationship 
between, management guidance and implied stock price crash risk for a company. 
Looking further at the additional results for the study, I can conclude that when company 
management doesn’t foresee an unexpected macro economic shock, they then are 
concerned about potentially being responsible for the failing to see the pitfall. This fear of 
being exposed for not understanding larger macro economic trends then leads 
management to try and withhold this guidance. However, management with holding 
guidance due to a failure to foresee an economic shock, only leads to the build up of bad 
information, which previous studies have shown causes the majority of stock price 
crashes and not actual major market crashes. Hopefully, this paper encourages further 
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research into the use of the implied volatility skew, and management guidance behavior 
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